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Sovereign credit ratings affect a country’s financial well-being. The financial markets, at large, 
have become quite topical within the public space, as well as policy makers and academics. 
This area has been examined in detail, especially after the global financial crisis of 2008. Rating 
agencies have been under great scrutiny against their issued ratings and accused of favouring 
developed economies over developing ones by providing higher ratings to the former. 
Using a panel of emerging and developed countries over a period of ten years (June 2007 – 
June 2017), this study examines whether a change in sovereign credit ratings by one of the big 
three rating agencies has an effect on the volatility of the stock market. This dissertation makes 
use of an event study over various estimation windows, and the findings depict that changes in 
sovereign credit ratings do have an effect on stock market volatility. Rating downgrades tend 
to increase volatility whilst upgrades tend to decrease volatility. Countries that have lower 
ratings, classified as emerging economies, are no less sensitive to rating changes compared to 
developed markets and both observe a significant effect on volatility when there is a change in 
credit ratings.  
The credit rating agency that had the greatest impact on the volatility of the stock market in 
response to a rating change is S&P. This was for both upgrades and downgrades. Fitch and 
Moody’s did not elicit any significant findings. This shows that the market is more responsive 
to an announcement by S&P than the other agencies. 
An understanding of the actual effect of this volatility in the equity stock market will have 
implications for investors, governments, pension funds and asset holders by providing them 
with country risk assessments and giving them the ability to rebalance their portfolios as 
required. It also has an impact in determining the cost of capital and evaluating investments, 
which affect asset allocation decisions. 
This study has important information, which could help contribute to credit rating agencies’ 
understanding of the implications that their issued ratings have on the stock market and their 
contribution to volatility within the market place. The policy implications of this study could 
affect institutions, especially the Basel committee and banking institutions whom are highly 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background   
“Moody's, S&P and other credit rating agencies deserve a failing grade” – (Joffe, 2013) 
“Rating agencies still coming up short, years after the crises” – (Morgensen, 2016) 
“‘Egregious’ and ‘compromised’: India thinks ratings firms like S&P and Moody’s are biased” 
– (Karnik, 2017a) 
“How credit rating agencies rule the world” – (Kingsley, 2012) 
“Moody's fined: Agency admits to false credit ratings” – (Gombert, 2017)  
“S&P draws criticism as sets ratings reform” – (Stempel & Barley, 2008)  
“The Indian government has delivered a piercing criticism of rating firms like Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s” – (Karnik, 2017b)  
“The Credit Rating Controversy” – (Mallaby, 2015)  
“Who rates the raters?” – (The Economist, 2005)   
These are some of the international headlines that rating agencies have had to contend with in 
recent years—from questioning their ability to accurately assign ratings, to the informative 
value that their ratings have on the market. These credit rating agencies have further been 
criticised for not only being unable to predict the global financial crisis of 2008, but also the 
Asian crisis of 1997, with their slow reactions and actions possibly intensifying and prolonging 
the latter (Radelet & Sachs, 1998).  
The methods used by these agencies in arriving at these ratings have been brought into question, 
as these assessments tend to result in lower ratings for emerging markets, thus constraining 
growth (“BRICS Summit 2016”, 2016). Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, a 
grouping of countries commonly referred to as BRICS, have publicly voiced their disagreement 
with their sovereign credit ratings issued by major credit agencies, citing unfairness in their 




Development Bank, a multilateral bank formed by the BRICS countries, exploring the option 
of creating their own rating agency; one which understands the dynamics of emerging markets 
better in order to rate them more fairly (“BRICS agrees to fast track new credit rating agency”, 
2016). Other experts, such as Lourdes Casanova, have noted that rating agencies have a lesser-
known understanding of countries and products geographically far away, as opposed to those 
closer to home. This is  especially true for the big three rating agencies who control 95% of the 
market: the British Fitch, the American Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) (Karnik, 
2017b).  
Several studies have examined the effects of credit rating changes. Some of this research has 
considered the effects that credit ratings have on bond yields (Cantor & Packer, 1996; Hibbert 
& Barber, 2011; Afronso, Furceri, & Gomes, 2012). This research shows that credit ratings 
have a significant effect on bond yields and contagion effects on other bond markets within that 
geographic area. Other studies have looked at the effect that credit rating changes have on stock 
prices, with Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) finding that changes in credit ratings affect stock 
returns, as well as country risks. Timmermans (2012) also found that rating changes have a 
negative effect on stock returns. 
Nordern and Weber (2004) studied the effects that credit rating changes have on both the stock 
markets and credit default swaps (CDS) and documented, similarly to Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and Timmermans (2012), that rating changes do affect the stock market as 
well as the CDS market. These findings are in line with the theory that rating agencies are 
international institutions who provide information in the form of credit ratings to reduce the 
asymmetry of information between capital market participants. By providing new information 
to markets, this should intuitively have an effect on credit risk sensitive instruments such as 
stocks, bonds, and underlying derivatives. 
Given the effects that these credit rating changes should have on the above instruments, the 
expectation is that it will give rise to volatility in the markets. Very few studies, however, have 
explicitly examined the effects of changes in credit ratings on the volatility of markets. Hooper, 
Hume and Kim (2008) found that ratings upgrades decreased volatility, whereas downgrades 
increased volatility in the stock markets, while Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) found that stock 




1.2 Problem Statement  
In light of the attention and criticism that the credit rating agencies have faced in the BRICS 
countries, it is of value to understand precisely what effects these announcements have on the 
markets of these countries. Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek (1998) maintain that the best way to 
examine information and information linkages in financial markets is through volatilities. Yet, 
very few studies have explicitly examined the effect of changes in sovereign credit ratings on 
market volatility. In light of this gap, this study seeks to expand on the work of Hooper et al. 
(2012), Brooks, Faff, Hillier, and Hiller (2004), and Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) by 
considering the impact of sovereign credit rating changes on stock markets. This research will 
particularly focus on the BRICS countries, where the actions of the credit rating agencies have 
been the subject of much debate.  
The focus is not only on the effect of changes in the ratings, but the study also aims to 
distinguish whether upgrades or downgrades have different effects on volatility. It further 
investigates whether the volatility around the time of the announcement differs in emerging 
markets compared to developed markets and whether responses differ depending on which 
agency makes the announcement. As this study thus focuses on information and information 
linkages, it also provides important information about the efficiency of markets.  
1.3 Research Questions and Scope 
The research question, which is the focus of this study, is:  
What is the effect of a sovereign credit rating change on stock market volatility?   
 
The specific research objectives of this study are as follow: 
• to determine if a change in the sovereign credit rating (on both local and foreign 
currency debt) has an impact on the volatility of the stock market;  
• to assess whether the type of credit rating change, either an upgrade or a downgrade, 
elicits abnormal volatility and if so, whether it increases or decreases volatility; 
• to ascertain whether the impact of credit rating changes on stock market volatility differs 




• to examine if the announcement of a sovereign credit rating change by the different 
agencies has a different impact on the volatility of the stock market.  
1.4 Purpose and Significance of the Research 
The purpose of this study brings an understanding of the far-reaching effects and information 
conveyed to the market of a sovereign rating change. For example, following the downgrade 
by S&P on the South African (SA) foreign currency, rating it to junk status in response to the 
axing of Pravin Gordhan the finance minister, the Chief Executive Officer of Nedbank stated 
that “short-term volatility is expected in banking stocks” (Bonorchis, 2017).  
This study contributes to the literature by not only analysing a unique sample but also using a 
different methodology to Hooper et al. (2008) and Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012). This 
enables the dynamic effects of the credit rating changes to be captured through an event study, 
as opposed to a static panel regression used by these authors. This study is in line with the 
methodology used by Brooks et al. (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), and Timmermans (2012), 
and will contribute to the findings of the sensitivity of emerging markets’ responses to these 
ratings, as well as the rating agencies that have the most effect on the stock markets. 
The contribution of this study in examining the effect of changes in sovereign credit ratings on 
the volatility of stock markets in emerging countries will be to provide insight as to whether 
investors place substantial emphasis on these ratings when making investment decisions, and 
whether this differs across geographies. An understanding of the actual effect of this volatility 
in the equity stock market will have further implications for investors, governments, pension 
funds and asset holders by providing them with country risk assessments and giving them the 
ability to rebalance their portfolios as required. It also has an impact in determining the cost of 
capital and evaluating investments, which affect asset allocation decisions. 
Volatility implies risk, which in turn deters long-term investment into a country making it 
harmful for an emerging market that requires investment to grow. Fear affects the markets, 
which can sometimes lead to contagion. Volatility is also driven by reactions to news and is 
commonly referred to as the fear gauge. Long-term investors seek a better risk adjusted return 
environment. Investors do not like to make long-term investments in a market that has a high 




Long-term capital is more desirable as it enables countries to utilise these funds for long-term 
projects, which contribute to the growth of the country and economy. Long-term investors who 
want to understand the stability of markets, in light of credit rating changes, could use the 
research on the volatility effect of emerging and developed markets. This research will also 
assist short-term investors who can make quick money as speculators in a volatile market. 
Investors will also be able to align their investment horizons to longer or shorter periods, 
depending on the timing of the rating agency changes. Credit rating agencies themselves can 
benefit by understanding the effects that the ratings they issue have on the market. 
Overall, this research has important policy implications in light of the increased role of 
sovereign credit ratings under the current Basel banking regulatory framework. Basel 
regulations now require that certain sectors hold a specified rating in order to be held as assets 
for compliance reasons. This will especially have an impact on the banking industry, being the 
most affected. As per these proposed new regulations, banks are now required to hold certain 
grades of capital, as well as values, based on the various buckets of debt that are categorised 
into different tiers. This makes it more costly and expensive, which will affect the end consumer 
and the economy at large. The public has become much more aware of the effect that credit 
ratings have on the country’s economy. This information is more accessible to people given the 
rise of social media, as it affects their individual financial situation.  
The significance of credit ratings information on the stock market has implications for the semi-
strong form of market efficiency, which states that all public information should be immediately 
reflected in financial market prices (Treepongkaruna & Wu, 2012). The evidence found could 
influence the BRICS decision to create a new ratings agency by reinforcing the importance of 
credit ratings, as their impact could be much greater than generally perceived. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Chapter two discusses the literature, 
including both the theoretical review, as well as an examination of previous empirical studies 
on the effects of sovereign credit rating announcements on stock and bond markets. Chapter 
three focuses on the research methodology, including the dataset that was compiled for the 




chapter. Chapter four presents the findings of the study and analyses the results in the context 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
3 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature on credit rating changes and its effect on the 
stock market. It will also discuss the background of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and 
credit ratings themselves. Firstly, the review begins by understanding the importance of credit 
ratings, as well as how they are calculated. This is followed by the types of credit ratings 
available, which will then move into a review of the EMH. An empirical review on the topic 
will also be examined. This chapter concludes with a summary of the discussion of the literature 
review, findings, and the intention of this study. 
4 What are credit ratings and why are they important? 
Credit agencies provide credit risk information in the form of ratings to the public or a client, 
which could be a business or a country. This credit rating is issued by one of the credit rating 
agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are the top three) using a complex rating process which 
encompasses qualitative and quantitative information about the client in question that is both 
public and non-public. These ratings provide information to the market as to the 
creditworthiness of the client by implying the risk of default and repayment ability (Kronwald, 
2009). 
This study focuses specifically on sovereign credit ratings (SCR), which provide assessments 
on a national government’s ability and willingness to service debts in a timely manner 
(Treepongkaruna & Wu, 2012). By assigning a credit rating to a country, this provides country 
risk information to the market and to investors, which affect investment decisions. The lower 
the rating the higher the compensation required to attract investment as a reward for the 
riskiness of the bond (as per the fundamental relationship in finance of high risk, high reward). 
Whereas the higher the rating, the cheaper it is to borrow money due to lower risk. As such, for 
a country, these sovereign credit ratings influence the cost at which a country is able to borrow 
money in the market. The riskier the bond, the costlier it is to borrow for a country, further 
eroding the fiscus and increasing the debt to GDP ratio in order to service this debt. In contrast, 




Sovereign ratings are not only important for the government, but for the economy as a whole, 
as corporations that operate within that country generally cannot have higher ratings than the 
sovereign in which it is domiciled. This is commonly referred to as the sovereign ceiling 
doctrine (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002). Thus, when there is a sovereign downgrade, debt 
instruments within that country may have to be downgraded in line with the sovereign in which 
it operates. The impact on a corporation will be an increased cost of borrowing. Higher rates of 
borrowing increase the corporation’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) thereby 
increasing the return that investors require to justify their investment (Bekaert & Harvey, 1997). 
Corporations, in general, are fairly leveraged and it is rare to see a large corporation operating 
without debt. This has a direct effect on the cost of doing business in the country, which either 
increases or decreases overall economic growth and profitability, depending on the direction of 
the rating change. 
The rating agencies such as S&P, Moody’s and Fitch allocate ratings to a country. The different 
agencies use different rating methodologies, as well as different scales in order to arrive at these 
conclusions. These scales are available in Appendix A. However, they all make use of key 
pillars. Each of these pillars provide information to the agencies that enable them to make an 
informed decision by being able to rate the countries on their ability and willingness to service 
their debt. 
Moody’s uses four factors in order to arrive at their ratings:  
• economic strength: which depends on the growth potential, diversification, 
competitiveness, as well as national income and scale; 
• institutional strength: this drives economic policies of governments that contribute to 
economic growth and social welfare; 
• fiscal strength: the position of the public finances of the country; and 
• susceptibility to event risk: understanding the risk that sudden or extreme events will 
have on public finances (Moody’s, 2013b).  
S&P uses five factors when arriving at their credit ratings, these being: 
• political score: this reflects the political risks that a country may be facing as well as the 
institutional efficiency; 




• external score: which looks at external liquidity as well as the international investment 
position; 
• fiscal score: reflects the fiscal performance and flexibility as well as the debt burden; 
and 
• monetary score: which reflects monetary flexibility (S&P, 2012). 
Fitch uses four factors in their analyses, which are: 
• macroeconomic performance: reflected by inflation, as measured by the consumer price 
index (CPI), real growth in gross domestic product (GDP), as well as the volatility of 
this growth; 
• public finances: which includes gross debt, interest payments, budget balances, as well 
as public debt in foreign currency; 
• external financing: this is evaluated by looking at current account balances net of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), gross sovereign external debt, international reserves and 
external interest service; and  
• structural features of the economy: factors analysed include GDP per capita, reserve 
currency status, and years since default and governance indicators (Fitch, 2012).  
The political landscape and policy plans of a sovereign and their effects on the metrics used to 
arrive at a rating, are large contributors to the ratings. Given their ability to provide valuable 
forward-looking information, affects all aspects of a country, from social spending to economic 
growth and, accountability within the public and private sector (Fitch, 2012). 
5 Types of credit ratings 
Various types of rating announcements are important and need to be understood when gauging 
a country’s creditworthiness. This consists of not only an actual rating upgrade or downgrade, 
but an outlook or watch announcement as well. An outlook announcement is an announcement 
that an agency might make before the rating announcement. This generally happens a few 
weeks or months before a decision on an actual rating occurs.  
Further to this, there are two different types of currency credit ratings, being local and foreign 
currency, both for long- and short-term debt. Local ratings are allocated to countries that issue 




or Peso bonds for Brazil. Foreign ratings are issued to countries that issue foreign denominated 
bonds, for example, South Africa issuing a bond denominated in United States Dollars (USD), 
commonly referred to as Eurobonds. Initially, countries were only allocated a foreign rating as 
funding was only raised in foreign denominations. Over time, however, countries began to issue 
bonds in their own currency, which necessitated rating agencies issuing different ratings based 
on the different currency denominations of the bonds (Packer, 2003). 
As a credit rating is the ability and willingness of a country to service this debt, this definition 
led to differences between the foreign and domestic currency ratings of a country, commonly 
referred to as the ratings gap (Moody’s, 2010). Typically, a domestic currency rating is higher 
(i.e. a lower chance of default) than a foreign currency rating, mainly because of the ability of 
a country to service their local debt by having complete control over the supply of money. This 
control enables them to print more currency when required upon redemption (not taking into 
account inflationary concerns). This, however, holds true only for countries that use their own 
currency, but not for those that do not.  
For example, all countries within the European Union (EU) need to operate within the laws that 
govern the monetary policy of the Eurozone. As such, when Greece experienced difficulties in 
repaying their Eurobond debt in 2010, they were unable to print more money to service these 
debts. The same applies to countries that are dollarized and do not have their own currency, 
such as Zimbabwe. Countries that issue Eurobonds upon redemption will have to dig into their 
foreign currency reserves or go out and purchase the foreign currency from the market. This 
will open them up to foreign exchange risk, which in turn increases the risk of default, hence, 
accounting for a lower foreign currency debt rating.   
The rating gap that has existed between foreign and local currency has begun to narrow in 
recent years. Moody’s has found that defaults and losses within a sovereign are not specific to 
a foreign or local currency debt instrument, but rather, that these defaults occur across both 
foreign and local currency debt instruments. For example, if a country defaults, they default 
across all debt instruments thereby the risk of local and foreign currency debt is similar. As 
such, rating gaps are far smaller and less frequent (Moody’s, 2010). 
Credit ratings fall into two investment areas, namely investment grade and non-investment 
grade, with the latter commonly referred to as junk. If two or more rating agencies classify 




investment grade and vice versa for investment grade. Thus, it is possible to have a single 
agency classify it as junk whilst still maintaining an investment grade rating on the asset class. 
If, however, either S&P or Moody’s grade the local currency as investment grade irrespective 
if the foreign currency has been downgraded to junk, the sovereign will remain on the key 
global bond index such as the Citigroup World Bond index (Donnelley, 2017). 
When a country receives a junk rating on their debt, it is usually followed by capital flight 
where money flows out of the country. This happens because numerous investments, especially 
those by institutional investors such as pension funds, have a mandate that does not allow 
investments in junk bonds given the perceived riskiness of the investment. Capital flight, in 
turn, causes currency weakness (and fluctuations) due to the currency selloff that arises with 
moving capital offshore. Massive movements within the stock market are seen, as well as an 
increase in CDS spreads due the increased riskiness of the bonds; all of which could wipe 
substantial value off the stock exchange (Veritas Wealth, 2017). 
6 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1970), which explains how markets price 
information, is one of the cornerstones of financial theory and provides the theoretical 
underpinning for this study. This theory states that it is impossible to “beat the market” because 
existing share prices always incorporate and reflect all relevant information. According to the 
EMH, stocks trade at their fair value on the stock exchanges, making it impossible for investors 
to either purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices. As such, it should be 
impossible to outperform the overall market through expert stock selection or market timing, 
and the only way an investor can possibly obtain higher returns is by purchasing riskier 
investments (Fama, 1970; Jensen, 1978). Fama (1970), differentiated between three forms of 
market efficiency:   
1. Weak Form EMH 
If a market is weak form efficient, stock prices reflect all market information. This means that 
the rates of return on the market should be independent; past rates of return have no effect on 




used by traders to buy or sell stocks, will be ineffective, as they will not lead to abnormal returns 
(Fama, 1970).  
2. Semi-Strong Form EMH  
Under the semi-strong form of the EMH, a market is efficient if stock prices reflect all publicly 
available information such as annual financial statements and earnings releases, dividend 
announcements and macroeconomic factors. This form of market efficiency rests on the 
assumption that stocks adjust quickly to absorb new information. The semi-strong form EMH 
also incorporates the weak form efficiency conditions. Given the assumption that stock prices 
reflect all new available information and investors purchase stocks after this information is 
released, an investor cannot benefit over and above the market by trading on new information 
(Jensen, 1978). 
3. Strong Form EMH  
A market is strong form efficient if stock prices reflect all public and private information; thus, 
building on and incorporating the weak and semi-strong forms of the EMH. Given the 
assumption that stock prices reflect all information (public as well as private) no investor will 
be able to profit above the average investor even with new inside information (Fama, 1970). 
The strong form of EMH means that private information is priced into the share prices, and 
people with this information should not be able to make abnormal profits by trading on this. 
This is not consistent with Jaffe (1974), who finds considerable evidence that insider trades are 
profitable. Insider trading is illegal and people who engage in this practise are generally 
prosecuted. 
The announcement of a credit rating change provides information to the market. In an efficient 
market, this will have a direct impact on the market itself. Sovereign credit ratings provide 
information of the willingness and ability of a country to service their debts within a reasonable 
period. As bonds are debt instruments and are generally priced on credit ratings, a change in 
these credit ratings will change the pricing of these bonds. That is, it will become more 
expensive to service in the event of a downgrade and less expensive in the event of an upgrade, 




The riskier the instrument the higher the return required in order to compensate for the higher 
risk, making the instrument attractive to investors. Given that debt is generally an integral part 
of an organisation, this in turn should affect the share price, as the cost of capital is expected to 
increase. Studies such as Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll (1961) have proven markets to be 
efficient, incorporating information into the share price. Griffin, Kelly, & Nardari (2010) found 
that both developed and emerging markets exhibit the weak to semi-strong form of market 
efficiency, which encompassed all the countries within the sample used in this study.  
The expectation will then be that if a credit rating change provides new public information to 
the market then if the market is efficient, this information should immediately be reflected in 
the stock prices. This would thereby not allow investors to consistently profit by trading on this 
information, as found by Ross (1989), where the volatility of prices is directly linked to the rate 
of information flow in the market (Bekaert & Harvey, 1997). 
In the context of this study, the EMH will be the information flow (transmission mechanism) 
between credit rating changes and the volatility of the stock market. If a credit rating 
announcement consists of an information flow to the market (where the share prices did not 
fully reflect all available information), one will expect to see an effect on volatility as found by 
Ross (1989), given the markets the sample operates in have been found to be weak to semi 
strong efficient as per Griffin et al. (2010).  
7 Empirical review on rating changes 
Numerous studies have examined the effects that credit rating changes have on the economy. 
Most of these studies focused on the effect on stock market returns and bond yields. There have 
also been studies that looked at the different reactions between emerging and developed 
markets, as well as the different informational value that the three rating agencies communicate 
to the market.  
Using a panel of emerging markets and performing both panel regressions and event studies 
within a ten-day window and a hundred-day estimation period, Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) questioned whether changes in sovereign debt ratings and outlooks contribute to market 
instability by affecting market risk and stock returns. They found that rating changes directly 




emerging market sovereign rating news is contagious for bond and stock markets in these 
markets, particularly during periods of turmoil and particularly for neighbouring countries. 
These rating changes may unveil new (private) information about a country, which might fuel 
market rallies or downturns. The effect is likely stronger in emerging markets where problems 
of asymmetric info and transparency are more severe. 
Brooks et al. (2004) also made use of this ten-day window and hundred-day estimation period 
in an event study to examine the effect of downgrades and upgrades on national stock market 
indices. Their study built on other studies, which examined individual stocks by looking at 
national stock market returns. They found that only downgrades convey information to the 
market and only S&P and Fitch’s downgrades result in significant market falls. Their findings 
contradict Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), in that they found no evidence that emerging 
markets are more sensitive to credit rating changes. 
In terms of the informational value of credit rating agencies, an event study by Norden and 
Weber (2004) found that S&P and Moody’s exhibit the largest impact on both stock market 
returns and CDS spread changes. A study by Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) found that 
rating announcements directly affect corporate securities, although market anticipation often 
mutes the average effects. Richards and Deddouche (1999) expanded on the study of Hand et 
al. (1992) and found, by using emerging market data on bank stocks and examining the impact 
of rating changes on these stocks,  no statistically significant effects were found.  
Timmermans (2012) also looked at individual stocks, however, this study was done within the 
European market and across industries. Using an event study, the researcher found that 
downgrades result in significant abnormal returns, whilst upgrades result in negative significant 
abnormal returns, even though this is only for the period preceding the rating announcement.  
From an amplification perspective, Radelet and Sachs (1998) argue that severe downgrades 
during crisis periods can cause a country to become isolated from the international economy if 
its commercial banks get rated below investment grade, thereby amplifying the impact of the 
rating changes. This feeds into the importance of sovereign credit ratings of a country. The new 
Basel standards place a large emphasis on these ratings, as well as various levels of capital that 
financial institutions have to hold, which in turn can affect the liquidity in the market. Banks 
are generally more susceptible to changes in ratings rather than other types of stocks as found 




Turning to the effects of sovereign credit ratings on markets, emerging markets have been found 
to be more susceptible to sovereign rating changes than developed markets. This literature also 
documents a more general heightened sensitivity to macroeconomic events in emerging 
countries (Calvo & Mendoza, 2000; Chang, Cheng, & Khorana, 2000; Hooper et al., 2008). 
This is consistent with prior studies of the bond market reaction to sovereign rating changes 
(Larrain, Reisen, & von Maltzan, 1997).  
These studies, however, fell short in looking at the volatility effect on stock markets, which 
prompted the study of Hooper et al. (2008). By using a panel regression over an eight-year 
period, they found that among the rating agencies examined, only downgrades by S&P and 
Fitch, resulted in significant market falls. This is  in line with the findings by Brooks et al. 
(2004), who found S&P and Fitch elicit significant findings. Researchers found no differences 
between the sensitivity to rating changes in emerging markets and non-emerging markets. Their 
study further expanded on the finding that rating upgrades (or downgrades) significantly 
increased (or decreased) USD denominated stock market returns and decreased (or increased) 
volatility. Both return and volatility are more pronounced in the cases of downgrades, foreign 
currency debt, emerging market debt, and during crisis periods, which could amplify a crisis. 
Volatility is important to understand, as it affects the market in a way that can be unpredictable. 
Excess volatility within a market causes panic, which in turn can affect the market itself. This 
could lead to contagion and in extreme cases, lead to financial sector collapse. Therefore, 
understanding the drivers of volatility is an important risk management tool.  
The importance of volatility was discussed by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) who looked at the 
drivers of volatility in emerging markets, as it is a key input into the cost of capital calculation, 
making it critical in decisions to effectively allocate assets. Using the generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models, as well as regression analysis, 
they concluded that in fully integrated markets or developed markets, world factors strongly 
influence volatility, whereas in segmented or emerging markets, local factors strongly influence 
volatility. There is also a difference between emerging countries themselves and how they 
respond to drivers of volatility, with the conclusion that more open economies (open to world 
trade) tends to have lower volatility. Liberalisations in capital markets tend to decrease 




Expanding on this, Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) found that volatility is of particular concern 
as evidenced from the Asian financial crisis, using a pooled panel regression on both outlooks 
and credit rating changes. The researchers found that credit rating changes (outlooks having a 
more significant impact than actual rating changes) had a significant effect on stock market 
realised volatilities, with upgrades (downgrades) decreasing (increasing) volatility. During 
financial crises, these markets are sensitive to rating downgrades. Investment grade countries 
were found to have significantly lower realised volatilities in both stock and foreign currency 
markets. 
The literature above does speak to an effect of ratings on the stock market, as well as an 
amplified movement within emerging markets and some agencies receiving a greater reaction 
to their ratings than others do. This will enable this study to make a comparison by bringing all 
these pieces of information together to understand whether there is volatility in the market when 
there is news of a change in rating, if the market anticipates it, as well as whether this reaction 
is different between emerging and developed markets. This study aims to expand on this with 
a specific view on the equity portion of the market, focusing on volatility.  
8 Summary 
This chapter examined the concept of credit ratings, the reasons they are issued, as well as the 
informational value that accompanies them. It then went on to discuss the different types of 
credit ratings issued by the different credit agencies and into a discussion of the factors that 
each agency uses to arrive at their rating for a country. In further understanding the 
informational value that these ratings communicate to the market, a discussion on the efficient 
market hypothesis in terms of the theories that underline this study was discussed. As per the 
literature review, it was found that most markets are weak to semi-strong form efficient.  
The literature then goes on to examine the findings that other studies had explored when looking 
at the effect that credit rating changes have on the markets. Effects on bond yields, CDS spreads, 
contagion and stock returns have been examined in detail, with very few studies looking 
specifically at the volatility in the stock market, which is what this study aims to understand. 
Conflicting information on the effect of these credit ratings on emerging verses developed 
economies was found, as well as the informational value that the different credit rating agencies 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will look at the research methodology behind the event study adopted by this 
dissertation and is broken down as follows. Section two will look at the research approach and 
strategy that this study will follow and the main hypotheses. Section three will go into the 
sampling process to understand how the researcher arrived at the sample. The study will then 
expand into section four, which will analyse the data collection process as well as the frequency 
and choice of data chosen. Section five goes into the data analysis method used and the 
accompanying calculations that have been followed. Understanding the reliability and validity 
will be examined in section six. This chapter ends by understanding the limitations of this study. 
3.2 Research Approach and Strategy 
This study seeks to examine the effects of sovereign credit rating changes on the volatility of 
the market. This study investigated the research question in the form of four main hypotheses 
linked to the research objectives specified in Chapter One. These hypotheses are as follow:  
Hypothesis one: 
H0: Sovereign credit rating changes (both local and foreign currency debt) do not have a 
significant effect on the volatility of stock markets. 
H1: Sovereign credit rating changes (both local and foreign currency debt) have a significant 
effect on the volatility of stock markets. 
Hypothesis two:  
H0: An upgrade has the same effect on the volatility of the stock market as a downgrade.  
H1: An upgrade has a different effect on the volatility of the stock market to a downgrade. 
Hypothesis three: 
H0: The effect of a ratings change is similar for both emerging and developed markets. 





H0: A rating agency’s announcement has a similar effect on the volatility on the market 
compared to other agencies. 
H1: A rating agency’s announcement has a different effect on the volatility on the market 
compared to other agencies. 
The approach of this study was similar to that of Essaddam and Mnasri (2014) in evaluating the 
effects of certain events on the volatility of the stock market by calculating the cumulated 
average volatility (CAV). Moreover, the standard calculations associated with an event study 
method across various event windows were used, following Timmermans (2012) amongst 
others. Other studies that have analysed credit rating changes using the event study 
methodology include, Brooks et al. (2004), and Norden and Weber (2004), although these 
studies focused on returns as opposed to volatility. Other studies that have utilised different 
methods include the panel regression model in understanding the effects of an event on 
volatility. Studies that have used this method include Hibbert and Barber (2011), Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002), and Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012).  
Both these methodologies are complementary in the sense that they show different aspects of 
the data. However, whilst the panel regression model is good in studying the effect of ratings 
on spreads and stock returns, it fails to examine the dynamic effects that occur in the case of 
upgrades and downgrades. It is important to analyse the dynamic effects, as market participants 
generally anticipate rating changes, hence an event study will be able to observe any changes 
that take place before the announcements. De Jong (2011), and Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) believe that an event study is a useful tool in defining abnormal residuals of a market 
model, as it accounts for “beta” differences when calculating abnormality. 
Several countries are included in the sample. Examining one country only is unlikely to provide 
particularly informative results, because rating changes do not occur that regularly and thus, by 
stacking/pooling events across countries, there are more observations. The countries comprise 
of both emerging and developed markets. This is an exploratory research topic of a quantitative 
nature, given the nature of volatility in trying to ascertain the relationship between a credit 





As mentioned in the previous section, because changes in sovereign credit ratings occur 
infrequently, in order to obtain more, robust conclusions, this study examined a panel of 
countries rather than only a single country. In particular, five countries were included with a 
mixture of both emerging and developed markets.  
In choosing the sample, given that one of the motivations of this study was the BRICS bank 
citing unfairness in the credit rating of developing countries, this study began by studying the 
BRICS countries and the data available. However, after analysing the existing data, especially 
around reliability and transparency, the developing country sample was driven down to include 
only SA, India and Brazil. That is, China and Russia were excluded from the sample due to the 
lack of trust around the accuracy of the economic indicators that both Russia and China publish 
(Movchan, 2017). “China has reported its latest economic growth data and once again it is 
almost perfectly in line with the official target. Investors in China and the global economic 
community may be breathing a sigh of relief, but like every other time, there is suspicion over 
whether we can actually trust these figures” (Illmer, 2016). Given the factors that credit rating 
agencies use as discussed previously, a large portion of what they use to arrive at their credit 
rating has to do with the economic and financial indicators, which in turn could cast doubt on 
these ratings.  
Two developed countries were also chosen namely, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States of America (USA), to be able to have them as a point of comparison for the three 
emerging markets. The period used by other studies examining the effects of credit rating 
changes varies. Hooper et al. (2008) used an eight-year period and Timmermans (2012) used a 
15-year period. Volatility studies such as Essaddam and Mnasri (2014) used an 11-year period 
with Agrawal, Bharath and Viswanathan (2003) examining only a period of five years. 
Recognising that a longer horizon enables more events to be included, the period for this study 
was chosen at ten years, covering the period from the 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2017. Moreover, 
this period also includes the most recent global financial crises of 2008 and the Euro debt crisis, 




3.4 Data Collection, Frequency and Choice of Data 
The data gathered for the purposes of this analysis are all secondary in nature. In addition, credit 
rating changes were obtained. Firstly, sovereign credit ratings for both the long-term local and 
foreign currency for the five countries in the sample were obtained from the top three rating 
agencies namely S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. These three agencies account for 94% of the rating 
announcements in the world (OECD, 2010), which justifies the selection in not considering any 
other rating agency. The Moody’s rating changes were gathered from the Moody’s website, 
whilst those from Fitch and S&P were obtained from Bloomberg. Secondly, daily data on each 
country’s volatility index was required. Initially, information for the various volatility indexes 
available on all the major stock exchanges was considered as a viable measure.  
For example, the USA Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index commonly 
referred to as the VIX, is a volatility index based on the underlying S&P 500, although prior 
2003, the underlying index was the S&P 100 (CBOE, 2014). However, given that this study 
commenced in July 2007, this change in the underlying index would not have had an effect on 
the dataset. A breakdown in the calculation of the VIX is available in Appendix B. 
The index most commonly used to refer to the UK stock market is the Financial Times Stock 
Exchanges (FTSE) 100, which comprises of the 100 corporations listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) that have the highest market capitalisation. The implied volatility from this 
index is known as the FTSE 100 IVI, which is similar to the VIX (UK VIX).  
The SA equivalent of this volatility index is known as the South African Volatility Index 
(SAVI), with the underlying being the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Top 40 index. This 
volatility index was only introduced to the market in 2007 and the calculation was changed in 
2009 in order to encompass all aspects of volatility (Kotze, Joseph & Oosthuizen, 2009) which, 
however, makes the SAVI index not ideal to use. The new calculation is available in Appendix 
C.  
The Indian VIX is based on the National Stock Exchange India Fifty (NIFTY 50) index, which 
comprises the 50 largest stocks on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India. It is computed 
based on the method of the CBOE VIX (India VIX brochure), making it quite similar in 




Brazil does not have its own volatility index based on the Bolsa de Valores do Estado de São 
Paulo (BOVESPA), the most common index of the country’s stock market, comprising of about 
sixty stocks. Instead, a volatility index called the CBOE Brazil Emerging market exchange 
traded funds (ETF) Volatility Index, known as VXEWZ, exists. It tracks the forward-looking 
volatility of a dollar-denominated index, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Brazil 
Capped ETF (EWZ), of both equities from the Brazilian market and the foreign exchange 
market (A volatility index and the volatility premium in Brazil). Thus, to use this index would 
differ notably from those of the other countries, which are purely based on the stock market.  
The selected countries in this study have all experienced changes in the calculations over time. 
There is also different methodology that exists across the various markets, and in some cases, 
markets do not have volatility indexes. These facts led to this study instead utilising the 
conditional volatility estimate from a regression of stock market returns in order to ensure 
uniformity within the analysis. The Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model was used for this purpose. Other studies that have utilised the GARCH 
method when using volatility as an input include Afonso, Fuceri and Gomes (2012), and 
Essaddam and Mnasri (2014).  
By using the major indexes from the sample countries as the underlying index, as well as the 
MSCI world market index for a global comparative, the GARCH model was then appliedto 
these underlying indexes to arrive at daily volatility figures. These daily volatility figures were 
obtained directly from the New York University (NYU) Volatility institute for the ten-year 
period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2017. The GARCH calculation and approach that was used by 
the institute in arriving at these values is available in appendix D. 
3.5 Data Analysis Methods 
As mentioned previously, to study the effects of a credit rating change on the volatility of the 
stock market across five countries, this paper employed an event study methodology, which is 
commonly used in finance literature. The event study technique provides an estimate of the 
market's reaction to a sovereign credit rating announcement and captures the dynamic effects 
around the time of changes in ratings (Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan, & Rose, 2007). In addition, 
it can help determine whether the actions of rating agencies have sustained or had transitory 




of an event study include Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2011), who found a significant response 
of government bond yield spreads to changes in both the credit rating and outlook. Reisen and 
von Maltzan (2007) also utilised an event study when examining the link between sovereign 
ratings and bond yield spreads.  
Standard event study methodology entails linking events to abnormal returns (Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2002). However, as this study examines volatility rather than returns, it will follow 
the event study approach of Essaddam and Mnasri (2014) and Agrawal et al. (2003), by 
calculating the abnormal volatility and examining these effects using various windows as done 
by Timmermans (2012) who utilised De Jong’s (2011) three step approach. This methodology 
will allow examination of the effects of credit rating changes on the volatility of the stock 
markets. It will further be broken up into examining the effect of upgrades and downgrades, as 
well as being able to compare whether developed and emerging markets may react differently 
and finally, whether the effects on volatility of a rating change differ across the rating agencies. 
The credit events were “clean” events and this study only examined actual upgrades and 
downgrades by the three rating agencies. In order to keep these clean, there could not be an 
overlap of another rating change within the event window. This was done in order to isolate the 
effect of each rating change, which follows Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Hooper et al. 
(2008). 
The three steps in an event study according to De Jong (2011) are as follow:  
• identifying the event itself and the timing of this event; 
• calculating the expected volatility for the normal volatility behaviour; and 
• calculating and analysing the abnormal volatility around the event date.  
There is no commonly accepted length of the estimation window, with Essaddam and Mnasri 
(2014) using 500 days, Timmermans (2012) using 250 days, and Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) and Brooks et al. (2004) both utilising a 100-day estimation window. This event study 
will use 100 days before the window period as the estimation period for computing the expected 
volatility in keeping with Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Brooks et al. (2004). 
This study evaluated different window periods around each event to examine if there are 




examined in this study are −29/30 days; −15/15 days; −10/10 days; −10/1 days ; −1/1 day and 
−1/5 days, where the credit rating change occurs on day 0 (thus minuses indicate days prior to 
the credit rating change and pluses indicate days post the credit rating change). These window 
periods follow those of Timmermans (2012) and enable a comprehensive review of the 
volatility effects to be undertaken. 
The expected volatility for the window period is needed in order to be able to compute the 
abnormal volatility. This expected volatility represents what the volatility would have been, 
had the event not occurred i.e. the “normal”. The first step in this process was to estimate the 
following regression:  
𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑉𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (1) 
Where: 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the volatility of country i’s stock market at time t and 𝑉𝑤𝑡 is the volatility of the 
world index at time t. This regression was estimated using ordinary least squares for the 100 
days prior to the start of the event window. The expected (or normal) volatility for each day in 
the event window was then computed as:  
𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂? + ?̂?𝑉𝑤𝑡             (2) 
Where: 𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the expected or normal volatility of country i on day t of the event window 
(Timmermans, 2012).  
The abnormal volatility (𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡) can then be easily computed as follows:  
𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡           (3) 
The abnormal volatility was calculated for each event, but this is not particularly informative, 
as there could be other drivers of volatility unrelated to rating changes within these individual 
events. Computing an average of the information over the events improves the information 
content of the analysis. The unweighted cross-sectional average abnormal volatility (𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡) at 










Where: N is the number of events in the sample. In calculating this average, the information 
unrelated to the volatility effect of a ratings change associated with each event should cancel 
each other out. 
In order to test whether the average abnormal volatility on day t of the event window is 
statistically significantly different from zero, the t-statistic is calculated as follows: 
𝑇 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =  √𝑁
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑆𝑡
            (5) 
Where: 𝑆𝑡 is the standard deviation and is computed separately according to equation 6.   
The t-statistic is approximately normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one (Timmermans, 2012). 
𝑆𝑡 =  √
1
𝑁−1
 ∑ (𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡)2
𝑁
𝑖=1          (6) 
Given that the effect of the sovereign credit rating change could be reflected in the volatility 
indexes several days prior to, as well as several days post the announcement, it is important to 
look at longer periods, which is the reason this study has used various event windows. This is 
reflected in the cumulative abnormal volatility (𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑡), calculated according to the formula:  
𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
           (7) 
Where: the daily abnormal volatilities are summed from the start of the event window 𝑡1 to the 
end of the event window 𝑡2 (Agrawal et al., 2003). 
Finally, the cumulative average abnormal volatility (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡) was obtained by summing the 
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡 across the cross section of events as per standard event studies (Timmermans, 2012). This 
is seen in equation 8:  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                      (8) 
To test for significance, the cumulative average abnormal volatility, the t-statistic, which also 
approximately follows a normal distribution, was obtained:  
𝑇 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =  √𝑁
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑆𝑡





𝑆𝑡 =  √
1
𝑁−1
 ∑ (𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑖 − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉)2
𝑁
𝑖=1        (10) 
The results from these calculations will be discussed in the next chapter. 
3.6 Research Reliability and Validity 
The event study methodology that was used has been employed by many other scholars, as 
discussed in previous sections, over different type of data, markets and periods; thus providing 
validity and reliability to the approach used. In order to reduce biases and errors across different 
panel data, the event windows were kept “clean” by ensuring that there was only one rating 
change that occurred during the window in the analysis. The use of GARCH estimates of the 
volatility of the market across all countries means that the results across the countries are 
directly comparable and can be included in the same event study, which would not have been 
the case if the volatility indexes had been used.  
3.7 Limitations 
Given time constraints, this study did not look at contagion between countries or bond 
correlation and focused specifically on the volatility arising due to a sovereign credit rating 
change. This study did not include outlooks or rating watches as part of the events but rather 
only specific rating changes being either an upgrade or a downgrade. Only long-term rating 
changes for both the local and foreign currency were used. Short-term rating changes have been 
excluded from this study. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter laid out the various hypotheses that this study has undertaken to analyse in order 
to answer the research question of the effect of sovereign rating changes on the volatility of the 
stock market. It then went on to provide an in depth view of the empirical methodology used in 
this study, as well as the reasoning behind choosing this method.  
The secondary data obtained from Bloomberg, the various rating agencies and the NYU 




form part of the analysis. The event study methodology used was then broken down into each 
step that this study followed, as well as the reliability and validity of both the methodology and 
the variables employed.  
In completion of this chapter, limitations as to what will not be analysed in this study were 





CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis on credit rating changes, as well as their effect 
on the volatility of the stock market. Section two provides a historical background analysis of 
credit rating changes over time per country to understand the drivers, as well as the results from 
the event study. Section three then presents the results from the event study and examining the 
significance of results under the various hypotheses presented in the previous chapter and what 
these finding mean.  
4.2 Country analysis of rating changes 
Over the ten-year period that this study examined, being from 1 June 2007 to 30 June 2017, the 
following rating upgrades and downgrades, sources of which are secondary in nature, have been 
observed per each country within the sample. 
Table 1: Upgrades and Downgrades by country 
 
Source: (Moody’s, Bloomberg, 2017) 
The sovereign credit rating history of each country in the sample is briefly examined in the 
following sections to better understand the economic, political and other factors that have 
contributed to the changes in each country’s perceived ability to repay its debt according to the 
credit rating agencies. The country analysis will include reasons around rating and outlook 
changes, as this is a more descriptive analysis. 
 
Total Changes Upgrades % Downgrades %
SA 14 1 7% 13 93%
Brazil 15 7 47% 8 53%
India 2 2 100% 0 0%
USA 1 0 0% 1 100%
UK 4 0 0% 4 100%




4.2.1 South Africa 
South Africa ranks as the best performing of the developing countries in the sample regarding 
their historical ratings over the study period from 2007 to 2017. It managed to maintain its 
investment grade ratings for most of this period across both local and foreign currency debt. Up 
until 2009, SAs credit rating improved across all credit agencies due to good macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies, maintaining the free-floating exchange rate, well-handled public sector 
finances and a large amount of exports given the country’s abundant natural resources. The 
latter strengthened the country’s foreign reserves position, which in turn improved the foreign 
currency credit ratings. Liquidity was not a concern and the country did not hold substantial 
amounts of debt relative to their GDP at 31.3%, as seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: South Africa Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: (Trading economics, 2016) 
Given the high foreign currency reserves and low debt levels, the ratings gap began to close in 
2009 according to Moody’s (2009a). Fitch, on the other hand, only closed this gap in 2016. As 
per S&Ps ratings, a gap for South Africa still existed with the foreign currency debt rated lower 
than the local currency debt. Over the long-term, this gap has narrowed, given that it began with 
an average of a three-notch difference that has been reduced to a single-notch difference 






















Table 2: South African credit rating changes and outlook history 
 
Source: (Moody’s, Bloomberg, 2017) 
From 2009, the ratings began to come under pressure due to a higher demand on public 
finances, which were driven by service delivery. This social requirement began affecting the 
economy from a financial perspective. During this time, Moody’s upgraded the foreign 
currency rating due to higher foreign currency reserves and a net foreign asset position in the 
banking system. Whilst issuing a downgrade to the local currency rating, citing concerns over 
the debt ratio due to expected increased spending as shown in Figure 1. 
Since then, socioeconomic and political issues have plagued the SA government resulting in 
steady credit rating decreases. Reasons for these downgrades included high unemployment 
rates, a decline in the institutional strength of government departments, slower growth and a 
reduction in competitiveness due to the high labour costs in the country, relative to the rest of 
the world. Infrastructure shortfalls were costly and there was a large percentage of the 
population without basic infrastructure years after democracy (Moody’s, 2012). Setbacks 
occurred in the mining sector in the form of lower commodity prices and strikes (such as that 
at Marikana) that forced shutdowns, as well as higher wage demands. Mines are the country’s 
biggest employer contributing to growth and as the biggest exporter in the country, they are the 
main source of foreign exchange earnings (Moody’s, 2013a)  
South Africa
Date Agency Announcement Foreign Currency Rating Local Currency Rating
05-Jun-07 M Foreign Currency : Positive Outlook Baa1 A2
12-Mar-09 M Local currency constant :Downgrade watch Baa1 A2
16-Jul-09 M Foreign currency upgrade and Local currency downgrade A3 A3
25-Jan-11 S&P Local currency downgrade BBB+ A
27-Sep-12 M Local and foreign currency downgrade Baa1 Baa1
12-Oct-12 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade BBB A-
10-Jan-13 F Local and foreign currency downgrade BBB BBB+
17-Jul-13 M Local and foreign currency constant : Negative outlook Baa1 Baa1
13-Jun-14 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade BBB- BBB+
06-Nov-14 M Local and foreign currency downgrade Baa2 Baa2
04-Dec-15 F Local and foreign currency downgrade BBB- BBB
15-Dec-15 M Local and foreign currency constant : Negative outlook Baa2 Baa2
08-Mar-16 M Local and foreign currency constant : Downgrade watch Baa2 Baa2
06-May-16 M Local and foreign currency constant : Negative outlook Baa2 Baa2
22-Jul-16 F Local currency downgrade BBB- BBB-
02-Dec-16 S&P Local currency downgrade BBB- BBB 
03-Apr-17 M Local and foreign currency constant : Downgrade watch Baa2 Baa2
03-Apr-17 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade : Negative outlook (Foreign) BB+* BBB-
07-Apr-17 F Local and foreign currency downgrade BB+* BB+*





Coupled with these woes was a shortage of electricity, which further dampened growth 
prospects in South Africa. Interest rates were also increased, hurting the consumer. The debt 
ratio continued to rise year-on-year as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Political risk became a major concern for the country towards the end of 2016, when the then 
president, Jacob Zuma, who was facing corruption charges, replaced a respected finance 
minister with an unknown candidate, spooking investors. He was forced to backtrack on this 
decision, but billions of Rand were already wiped off the stock exchange, thereby questioning 
the integrity of government institutions. Transparency and integrity of institutions are important 
pillars contributing to the rating of a sovereign. 
In 2017, S&P as well as Fitch downgraded South Africa. S&P downgraded the foreign currency 
rating into junk, whilst maintaining an investment grade of the local currency, whereas Fitch 
downgraded both local and foreign currency ratings into junk as at 26/4/2017. SA local currency 
bonds are still investment grade as only one rating agency (Fitch) has deemed it junk. Given 
that S&P as well as Fitch have rated the long-term foreign currency rating as non-investment 
grade, it reaffirms the rating making South African foreign currency bonds junk. 
4.2.2 Brazil 
Brazil’s ratings gap is quite similar to SAs from S&P. They maintained this gap until 2016 
when it was eventually closed. Fitch and Moody’s did not have a ratings gap for the country. 
Brazil’s rating was in junk territory until 2007 when there was a gradual increase of ratings 
across all agencies, with S&P being the first to push their local rating into investment grade in 
2007, Fitch following in 2008, and Moody’s a year after that. The rationale for this was that the 
government of Brazil began managing their debt well with further plans to reduce their debt 
burden during 2007. This resulted in favourable debt ratios, which improved the overall debt 
structure of the country itself and led to the credit rating being an investment grade as shown 








Figure 2: Brazil Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: (Trading economics, 2016) 
This positivity on the debt front coupled with the ability of Brazil to withstand the global 
financial crisis of 2009 demonstrated their strengths of policies, markets and their economy, 
which had previously been largely untested. This further improved their rating with all agencies. 
In particular, the rating agencies highlighted the country’s “shock absorption capacity, policy 
capability of government, strong economic and financial resilience, evidence of strong 
economic and financial resilience, features typically associated with investment-grade 
sovereign credits, as could be seen in the modest and short-lived contraction in GDP, minimal 
weakening in the country's international reserve position, moderate deterioration in the 
government debt indicators and lack of financial stress in the banking system” (Moody’s, 
2009b). 
Brazil’s highest rating as per all rating agencies occurred in 2011 due to the above factors, as 
well as policy adjustments made by government in order to maintain these changes, which 
provided comfort for sustainable growth in the medium term. From 2014, S&P began to 
downgrade Brazil firstly by outlook and then by the ratings themselves (again the first agency 























Table 3: Brazil credit rating changes and outlook history 
Source: (Moody’s, Bloomberg, 2017) 
Growth in the country was subdued and the effects of poor governance began to filter through 
in the form of deteriorating government reporting, as well as increased borrowing which in turn 
was used to finance bank lending adversely affected credit metrics (Moody’s, 2014).  
This low growth persisted over the next few months, negatively influencing investor sentiment, 
resulting in negative capital flows. The deterioration of the economy resulted in a recession, 
which was exacerbated by a lack of political consensus on fiscal reforms by government, 
continued rising debt burdens, affordability and high government spending. This forced S&P 
to downgrade Brazil’s foreign currency credit rating to junk or non-investment grade in 
September 2015. Fitch followed suit in December of that year although they downgraded both 
foreign and local currency into junk in the following February. As poor governance as well as 
the relevant metrics could not justify an investment grade with Moody’s, they downgraded the 
country as well. S&P then downgraded the local currency debt as the local currency had 
depreciated by approximately 20%. By February 2016, both local and foreign currency long-
term ratings were rated junk by all agencies. Moody’s projected that within the next three years 
Brazil
Date Agency Announcement Foreign Currency Rating Local Currency Rating
23-Aug-07 M Local and foreign currency upgrade Ba1* Ba1*
30-Apr-08 S&P Local and foreign currency upgrade BBB- BBB+
29-May-08 F Local and foreign currency upgrade BBB- BBB-
06-Jul-09 M Constant rating : Upgrade watch Ba1* Ba1*
22-Sep-09 M Local and foreign currency upgrade Baa3 Baa3
04-Apr-11 F Local and foreign currency upgrade BBB BBB
20-Jun-11 M Local and foreign currency upgrade Baa2 Baa2
17-Nov-11 S&P Local and foreign currency upgrade BBB A-
02-Oct-13 M Rating affirmed: Stable outlook Baa2 Baa2
24-Mar-14 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade BBB- BBB+
09-Sep-14 M Constant rating : Negative outlook Baa2 Baa2
11-Aug-15 M Local and foreign currency downgrade Baa3 Baa3
09-Sep-15 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade BB+* BBB-
15-Oct-15 F Local and foreign currency downgrade BBB- BBB-
09-Dec-15 M Constant rating : Downgrade watch Baa3 Baa3
16-Dec-15 F Local and foreign currency downgrade BB+* BB+*
17-Feb-16 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade BB* BB*
24-Feb-16 M Local and foreign currency downgrade Ba2* Ba2*
05-May-16 F Local and foreign currency downgrade BB* BB*
15-Mar-17 M Constant rating : Stable Ba2* Ba2*
22-May-17 S&P Constant rating : Negative watch BB* BB*





debt will likely exceed 80% of Brazil’s GDP with political issues and uncertainty likely to delay 
or prevent the implementation of any structural reforms to address the deterioration in the 
economy (Moody’s, 2016). 
Although the economic numbers saw an improvement at the beginning of 2017, (Moody’s, 
2017) (Moody’s rating action 2017), such as lower inflation and the stabilisation of the 
economy, Brazil is on a negative watch with possibilities of further downgrades. This is due to 
the political turmoil that has plagued the country in the form of the president’s corruption 
allegations further stalling any policy reforms that could take place. 
4.2.3 India 
India is an interesting country in terms of credit ratings, as it is one of only four where the 
foreign currency long-term rating has been higher than the local currency rating, which 
occurred between 2007 and 2011 by Moody’s. The reason cited for this was a larger balance of 
foreign exchange reserves relative to the smaller portion of outstanding foreign currency debt  
(Packer, 2003). The other agencies were keeping with the norm that if a ratings gap did exist, 
the local currency debt was rated higher than the foreign currency debt. 
Moody’s was the first country to upgrade India’s foreign currency rating, with Fitch following 
suit two and a half years later and S&P another six months thereafter, though they have 
upgraded both the foreign currency and local currency debt ratings. Moody’s finally upgraded 
the local currency debt to investment grade in 2011, almost eight years after their upgrade of 
the foreign currency rating for the country. This is largely due to closing the ratings gap and 
citing the resilience of the Indian economy during the global economic crisis. The credit metrics 
remained stable and the institutional and structural reforms implemented by the government 
over the preceding few years have been favourably received by the agencies. 
India’s economic growth has been phenomenal, with the country recording the highest growth 
among the G20 countries in the first quarter of 2015 (OECD, 2015). Various economic and 
institutional reforms to encourage and maintain this high growth environment have been 
implemented, such as inflation targeting, which is expected to keep inflation in check and avoid 
a hyperinflationary situation. India’s last rating change, as per the sample window, was by 





The agencies have been heavily criticised by the government of India. Even though the 
fundamentals of the country have been improving, the rating has been constantly maintained 
one notch above junk. Fitch has maintained its rating for India for the past 11 years, citing a 
weak fiscal position and a difficult business environment even though there is a strong medium-
term growth as per their last assessment (“Fitch keeps India’s ratings at "BBB", unchanged for 
11 years,” 2017). S&P has also maintained their investment grade one notch above junk for the 
past decade. 
Table 4: India credit rating changes and outlook history 
Source: (Moody’s, Bloomberg, 2017) 
4.2.4 United States of America 
Turning to the developed countries in the sample, the USA is frequently referred to as the 
superpower of the world, both politically and economically. They have been afforded the 
highest credit rating by all agencies, commonly referred to as the gold standard, having always 
been investment grade for both their foreign and local currency debt. The former is intuitive 
given that most foreign currency debt of the rest of the world is usually priced in USD, meaning 
that a ratings gap should not occur given that both the foreign and local currency are 
denominated in the same currency. 
The only time the USA has ever had their rating downgraded or received a negative outlook, 
was in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2011. The reason cited was the amount of 
debt that the USA had relative to GDP. As shown in Figure 3, this rose dramatically from 2007 
India
Date Agency Announcement Foreign Currency Rating Local Currency Rating
15-Jul-08 F Foreign Currency : Stable outlook BBB- BBB-
15-Dec-09 M Local Currency : Positive outlook Baa3 Ba2*
18-Mar-10 S&P Foreign Currency : Stable outlook BBB- BBB-
26-Jul-10 M Local Currency upgrade Baa3 Ba1*
25-Feb-11 S&P Local Currency : Positive outlook BBB- BBB-
20-Dec-11 M Local Currency upgrade Baa3 Baa3
25-Apr-12 S&P Foreign Currency : Negative outlook BBB- BBB-
13-Jul-12 F Foreign Currency : Negative outlook BBB- BBB-
12-Jun-13 F Foreign Currency : Stable outlook BBB- BBB-
26-Sep-14 S&P Foreign Currency : Stable outlook BBB- BBB-
09-Apr-15 M Rating affirmed : Positive outlook Baa3 Baa3





to 2011. However, what is interesting in comparing the debt-to-GDP ratio of the USA to the 
developing markets in the sample is that it is far higher, with the ratio consistently above 100%. 
Yet, despite this, the USA has a far higher credit rating; thus confirming that the level of debt 
is not necessarily the driving force behind the ability or willingness of the country to repay its 
debt. In 2011, for example, when debt was 96% of GDP, there was a concern that the USAs 
debt ceiling would not be raised to meet the country’s debt obligation (Moody’s, 2011). 
Republicans and Democrats could not agree to this with each side pushing back on certain 
aspects, which forced S&P as well as Moody’s to issue a negative outlook on their respective 
ratings. 
Figure 3: USA Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: (Trading economics, 2016) 
 
The debt ceiling is a limit on the amount of debt that the country can hold at any given time, 
the value of which is set by Congress. When this limit is reached, the country is unable to pay 
bills, or even service debt as the tax revenues will be unable to meet the requirements of 
servicing the running expenses of the country as well as keeping up with interest payments of 
the debt holders. It is imperative that this ceiling is raised to ensure the country is able to operate. 
This has been the case as this ceiling was raised ten times in the past ten years. This debt ceiling 
is the biggest risk that faces the ability of the USA to service their debts, which ties into the 
political situation of the country as Congress has the power to either approve or decline this 




















Following the raising of the debt ceiling itself, Moody’s removed the downgrade watch from 
its rating, though they did keep the outlook negative whereas S&P downgraded the USA credit 
rating by a single notch with a negative outlook as shown in Table 5. This was the first time in 
the history that the USAs credit rating has not been AAA rated by one of the top three agencies.  
Table 5: USA credit rating changes and outlook history 
 
Source: (Moody’s, Bloomberg, 2017) 
 
S&P believed that using the vote of increasing the debt ceiling was becoming a political 
bargaining chip amongst the parties. The difficulty and uncertainty of this increases risk and 
questions the stability and predictability of policymaking, which affects the fiscal stability of 
the USA. In 2013, Fitch again put the USA on a negative outlook over the uncertainty that the 
debt ceiling was not going to be raised in time to avoid a default.  
Overall, apart from the policy issues relating to the debt ceiling discussed, the USA has a very 
strong economy and currency and it continues to grow. In 2015, the USD appreciated by 13.5%, 
and being a developed economy with various industries and trade deals they currently enjoy 
with the rest of the world, they were the least exposed to the slowdown in the emerging 
economies.  
4.2.5 United Kingdom 
The UK, the second developed country in this sample, also enjoyed the gold standard of rating 
from the time of their initial rating up until 2013 on both their foreign and local currency debt. 
The reason for the downgrade in 2013 as shown in Table 6, had to do it with the country’s 
reduced growth prospects as well as an increased debt burden arising from a larger deficit. Tax 
USA
Date Agency Announcement Foreign Currency Rating Local Currency Rating
24-Feb-11 S&P Rating maintained AAA AAA
13-Jul-11 M Downgrade watch Aaa Aaa
14-Jul-11 S&P Rating maintained : Negative outlook AAA AAA
02-Aug-11 M Rating maintained : Negative outlook Aaa Aaa
05-Aug-11 S&P Local and foreign currency downgrade AA AA 
18-Jul-13 M Rating maintained : Stable Aaa Aaa
15-Oct-13 F Rating maintained : Negative outlook AAA AAA




revenues were not expected to increase due to the tougher economic environment as well as 
slower growth. Moody’s further cited the deterioration of the shock absorption capacity of the 
government’s balance sheet. Interestingly, for the first time within this sample, Moody’s was 
the first agency to downgrade the UK. Fitch followed with a negative outlook and shortly 
thereafter issued an actual downgrade of one notch.  
Table 6: UK credit rating changes and outlook history 
 
Source: (Moody’s, Bloomberg, 2017) 
 
Over the next few years, the UK economy performed well. Politically a Scottish referendum 
took place during this time, which did not hurt them as the outcome of vote for independence 
by the Scottish failed to go through, keeping Scotland within the UK. However, in 2016, a 
referendum was put forward to decide if the UK should leave the EU having been a member 
since 1973. This relationship facilitated trade with the rest of the world and gave the UK 
substantial bargaining power, since negotiations were done as a bloc. In a vote that shocked the 
world as well as the UK policy makers themselves, Britain voted to leave the EU, in what is 
popularly referred to as Brexit. The fallout of this decision resulted in a change of Prime 
Minister, and massive uncertainties around what a UK not part of the EU will look like as well 
the financial repercussions of trade deals and the economy at large. The institutional strength 
of Britain was put into question regarding their ability to be able to manage these risks as well 
as the political uncertainty that arose with it. For these reasons, in June 2016, all of the three 
credit agencies reacted negatively to the news. Moody’s outlook changed to negative, Fitch 
downgraded both the foreign and local currency debt ratings of the UK by a single notch, whilst 
S&P’s downgrade was two notches, its first downgrade in its history of rating the UK. 
 
Date Agency Announcement Foreign Currency Rating Local Currency Rating
17-Feb-11 SP Rating maintained AAA AAA
22-Feb-13 M Local and foreign currency downgrade Aa1 Aa1
22-Mar-13 F Rating maintained : Negative outlook AAA AAA
19-Apr-13 F Local and foreign currency downgrade AA+ AA+
19-Sep-14 M Rating maintained : Stable Aa1 Aa1
24-Jun-16 M Rating maintained : Negative outlook Aa1 Aa1
27-Jun-16 F Local and foreign currency downgrade AA AA




4.3 Empirical Results 
This section details the results of the various analyses that were undertaken in order to answer 
the research questions posed in Chapter One of this study. 
4.3.1 All Rating Changes 
This analysis will test the first hypothesis being: 
H0: Sovereign credit rating changes (both local and foreign currency debt) do not have a 
significant effect on the volatility of stock markets. 
H1: Sovereign credit rating changes (both local and foreign currency debt) have a significant 
effect on the volatility of stock markets. 
In Figure 4, the AAV is presented for the longest window in the sample being (−29, 30) days. 
Around day zero, the abnormal volatility is very close to zero, showing muted volatility around 
the announcement day. However, markets seem to be less volatile in the days leading up to the 
announcement but more volatile afterwards, although none of these findings is significant.  
Figure 4: Average abnormal volatility for all rating changes 
 
Table 7 contains the CAAV for all rating changes for the different event windows. The CAAVs, 
though mostly positive, are quite small, demonstrating a small increase in volatility around a 
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Table 7: CAAV and p-values for all rating changes 
 
Given the lack of significance found across all rating changes, this study accepts the null 
hypothesis. 
4.3.2 Upgrades and downgrades 
The next hypothesis to be tested will be in relation to upgrades and downgrades.  
H0: An upgrade has the same effect on the volatility of the stock market as a downgrade.  
H1: An upgrade has a different effect on the volatility of the stock market to a downgrade. 
4.3.2.1 Upgrades 
In Figure 5, upgrades from all countries are presented for the window period (−29, 30). As can 
be seen, volatility is negative just before and after the rating announcement, implying a decrease 
in volatility around the announcement date, with a rapid increase towards the end of the event 
window. These results are significant. It should be noted that this upgrade sample only consists 
of emerging market data, as there were no upgrades for developed markets within the sample 
period. 
Figure 5: Average abnormal volatility for all upgrades 
 
 
Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
CAAVt -1.73                2.96                 2.46                 2.46                 0.76             2.75             
t stat -0.13                0.33                 0.38                 -0.07                0.55             0.94             
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The majority of the CAAVs are negative suggesting that (good news) an upgrade reduces 
volatility, especially for the longer event windows before the rating announcement. It seems 
that in the case of an upgrade, the market anticipates this beforehand as shown by the 59 and 
11-day windows, which are statistically significant at the 5% level. 




For downgrades, as depicted in Figure 6, volatility increases substantially before 
(approximately 10 days) and after the announcement. These findings are significant. This 
suggests that the market anticipates a downgrade and reacts to this anticipation increasing 
volatility. These results are in keeping with the findings by Norden and Weber (2004), who find 
that markets anticipate downgrades.  





Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
CAAVt -41.76              -23.32              -17.67              -14.47              1.28             2.58             
t stat -1.76                -1.12                -1.14                -1.61                0.40             0.33             
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For downgrades, there is an increased CAAV across all event windows, as shown in Table 9, 
which suggests an increase in volatility around downgrade announcements. The windows of 
significance are 30, 20 and 11. This is in line with Hooper et al.s’ (2008) study that downgrades 
increase volatility. The fact that downgrades increase volatility while the opposite is true for 
upgrades means that the effects analysed together, may offset each other. This may account for 
the largely insignificant findings when examining both these announcements (upgrades and 
downgrades) jointly.  
Table 9: CAAV and p values for all downgrades 
 
Given these findings, this study will have to reject the null hypothesis as upgrades and 
downgrades do not elicit similar responses in volatility, with upgrades decreasing volatility and 
downgrades causing an increase in volatility. 
4.3.3 Developed versus Emerging Markets 
A comparison between reactions in developed and emerging markets gives rise to the third 
hypothesis: 
H0: The effect of a ratings change is similar for both emerging and developed markets. 
H1: The effect of a rating change has different effects for emerging and developed markets. 
Figure 7 shows that around the rating announcement date there were large movements of 
significance in volatility of the stock markets of the UK and USA, decreasing drastically before 






Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
CAAVt 15.43               15.34               11.09               5.81                 0.54             2.82             
t stat 1.05                 1.84                 1.92                 1.49                 0.36             1.04             




Figure 7: Average abnormal volatility for all developed markets 
 
In this sample, all ratings that occurred within the developed markets were downgrades. This 
could explain the large increase in volatility, as shown earlier with downgrades increasing 
volatility. This increase in volatility for developed markets is statistically significant at the 30, 
20 and 11-day window. It shows that rating changes in developed markets have an increased 
effect on the volatility within them. 
Table 10: CAAV and p-values for developed markets 
 
Abnormal volatility in the emerging markets are a bit more subdued with a gradual increase 
seen just before the rating announcement and increasing afterwards, as well as for a few days 
afterwards, however these are not significant. This could imply that the market reacts once an 
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Average abnormal volatility for developed markets
t
Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
CAAVt 11.11               15.86               11.81               7.76                 -3.09           -2.02           
t stat 0.68                 1.46                 1.68                 1.97                 -0.67           -0.33           




Figure 8: Average abnormal volatility for all emerging markets 
 
Within the emerging markets, some CAAVs are positive and others negative across the varying 
event windows, this could be attributable to the inclusion of both upgrades and downgrades in 
the sample, which could also be the reason that none of these results is significant.  
 Table 11: CAAV and p-values for emerging markets 
 
In order to compare emerging and developed markets fairly, it is intuitive to strip out the 
upgrades from the emerging market sample. Results of upgrades within emerging markets are 
the same as Figure 8 and Table 11, as that sample only consisted of data from emerging 
economies. The findings of downgrades within emerging markets are as follows: 
There is a sharp rise in volatility before a downgrade announcement is made, as shown in Figure 
9 and it continues well after the event date, which is significant. This behaviour differs from 
the developed markets, which saw a decrease around the announcement date before 
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Average abnormal volatility for emerging marketsAAV
t
Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
CAAVt -3.70                0.98                 1.02                 -1.51                1.36             3.48             
t stat -0.25                0.10                 0.14                 -0.32                0.94             1.07             




Figure 9: Average abnormal volatility for emerging market downgrades 
 
These results are consistent with the findings of downgrades in developed markets, in that a 
downgrade results in an increase in volatility. This finding is significant at the 10% level for 
the 30 and 20-day window.  
Table 12: CAAV and p-values for downgrades in emerging markets 
 
Given the consistency of the results between developed and emerging economies, allows the 
study to accept the null hypothesis that developed and emerging markets have similar reactions 
to a change in credit ratings.  
The results from this analysis between emerging and developed markets, demonstrate that both 
upgrades and downgrades provide information to the markets. This suggests that the markets, 
both emerging and developed, are weak to semi-strong form efficient from observing their 
reactions to ratings news.  
4.3.4 Credit Rating Agencies 
In testing the fourth and final hypothesis this study will look at the following: 
H0: A rating agency’s announcement has a similar effect on the volatility on the market 
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Average abnormal volatility for Emerging market downgradesAAV
t
Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
CAAVt 16.45               15.22               10.92               5.35                 1.40             3.96             
t stat 0.92                 1.51                 1.55                 1.13                 0.92             1.29             




H1: A rating agency’s announcement has a different effect on the volatility on the market 
compared to other agencies. 
As mentioned previously, some studies have found that certain rating agencies elicit a larger 
reaction to their announcements than others do. In this sample, for the days preceding the 
announcement, volatility seems to be higher in anticipation of an announcement from Fitch in 
comparison to Moody’s and S&P. After the announcement, volatility increases for Fitch and 
S&P, with Moody’s prompting a decrease in volatility immediately after the announcement. 
However, none of these movements is significant. 
Figure 10: Average abnormal volatility per credit agency 
 
As noted in Table 13, none of these results is significant, as both upgrades and downgrades are 
included in the data. A more accurate analysis will be to break it up between upgrades and 
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Table 13: CAAV and p-values per credit agency 
 
By breaking the announcements up between upgrades and downgrades, a new trend emerges in 
Figure 11 for upgrades. Moody’s volatility reaction is quite subdued around the x-axis 
indicating little or no volatility until the end of the window, whilst Fitch tends to elicit an 
increased volatile reaction on the market both before and after the announcement. S&P sees a 
large drop in volatility before an announcement is made around the 13-day window but this 
gradually increases and spikes around the day of the announcement before decreasing again. 









Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
Moody's
CAAVt -25.13         -6.03           -1.36           -1.23           1.17             2.08             
t stat -1.10           -0.36           -0.13           -0.19           0.68             0.50             
p-value 0.1<p<0.15 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5
Fitch
CAAVt 30.69           12.15           3.77             1.63             -0.51           -0.01           
t stat 1.26             0.77             0.33             0.20             -0.19           -0.00           
p-value 0.1<p<0.15 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5
S&P
CAAVt -5.16           4.59             5.48             -0.94           1.46             5.98             
t stat -0.26           0.30             0.43             -0.12           0.49             0.99             




Figure 11: Average abnormal volatility per credit agency upgrade 
 
 
In studies such as Brooks et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004), S&P was the rating 
agency that consistently appeared to have the most substantive effect on the stock market. From 
the results in Table 14, one can see that upgrades are only significant upon the announcement 
of S&P, which is in line with these studies. The reaction in the market is decreased volatility 
upon the announcement of an upgrade by S&P, which is significant at the 5% level for the 29-
day window and at 0.5% at the 11-day window. This demonstrates that in the days leading up 
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Table 14: CAAV and p-values per credit agency upgrades 
 
 
In observing the effects of downgrades, Moody’s tends to increase towards the announcement 
date, whilst Fitch remains relatively constant at higher volatility levels well past the 
announcement date, which decreases towards the end of the window, however neither of these 
results are significant. As in the case of upgrades, S&P sees a sharp drop in volatility before the 
downgrade and a quick increase afterwards that is of significance. 
Figure 12: Average abnormal volatility per credit agency downgrade 
 
 
Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
Moody's
CAAVt -42.64           -25.46         -13.20         -7.86                 -0.15           -0.81           
t stat -1.17             -0.85           -0.66           -0.65                 -0.05           -0.11           
p-value 0.1<p<0.15 0.15<p<0.2 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5
S&P
CAAVt -86.94           -57.03         -44.08         -39.89               6.17             11.54           
t stat -1.95             -1.17           -0.89           -2.71                 0.46             0.34             
p-value 0.025<p<0.05 0.1<p<0.15 0.15<p<0.2 0.001<p<0.005 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5
Fitch
CAAVt 5.61               4.09             -2.44           -5.59                 -0.05           2.11             
t stat 0.20               0.08             -0.07           -0.29                 -0.01           0.12             
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As with the upgrades, Table 15 highlights that S&P is the only rating agency that shows 
significance at the 5% level for windows 30 and 11, whilst an increased significance level of 
0.5% can be seen in the 20-day window period. The CAAV demonstrates that for a downgrade 
pronouncement by S&P, there is increased volatility across all periods.  
 
Table 15: CAAV and p-values per credit agency downgrades 
 
 
Brooks et al. (2004) found that S&P have the biggest impact on market returns when 
announcing a downgrade. This study also finds that S&P produced the largest significant 
finding at 0.5% for an impact on volatility within a 20-day window, which is in line with their 
study. However, a 0.5% significance level is also observed for an upgrade by S&P at the 11-
day window, which shows that at various windows of observations, significance may change.  
Due to this finding, this study will have to reject the null hypothesis as S&P had a different 
effect on the volatility of the market compared to Moody’s and Fitch. 
 
 
Event window (-29,30) (-15,15) (-10,10) (-10,1) (-1,1) (-1,5)
Moody's
CAAVt -10.54         10.16                8.51                    4.29                  2.28             4.49             
t stat -0.35           0.58                  0.82                    0.68                  1.28             0.96             
p-value 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.2<p<0.25 0.25<p<0.5 0.1<p<0.15 0.15<p<0.2
Fitch 
CAAVt 37.85           14.45                5.54                    3.69                  -0.64           -0.62           
t stat 1.23             0.82                  0.44                    0.39                  -0.20           -0.11           
p-value 0.1<p<0.15 0.2<p<0.25 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5 0.25<p<0.5
S&P
CAAVt 15.29           20.00                17.88                  8.80                  0.28             4.59             
t stat 0.96             1.87                  2.28                    1.83                  0.11             1.14             





This chapter examined the history of credit rating changes and outlooks for the countries within 
this sample and the reasons these occurred over the ten-year period. The chapter then went into 
the examination of the empirical analysis in testing the various hypotheses that were put 
forward at the beginning of this study. The findings of which can be summarised as follow: 
Hypothesis one:  
H0: Sovereign credit rating changes (both local and foreign currency debt) do not have a 
significant effect on the volatility of stock markets. 
H1: Sovereign credit rating changes (both local and foreign currency debt) have a significant 
effect on the volatility of stock markets. 
The study found that when using both upgrades and downgrades together in analysing the effect 
of a ratings change on volatility, they tend to cancel each other out resulting in no significant 
effect on the volatility of the stock market. 
Hypothesis two:  
H0: An upgrade has the same effect on the volatility of the stock market as a downgrade.  
H1: An upgrade has a different effect on the volatility of the stock market to a downgrade. 
Opposite effects have been observed when looking at the reactions to upgrades and downgrades 
on the volatility of the market. Upgrades have been found to decrease the volatility of the stock 
market, whilst downgrades increased volatility.  
Hypothesis three: 
H0: The effect of a ratings change is similar for both emerging and developed markets. 
H1: The effect of a rating change has different effects for emerging and developed markets. 
Downgrades within both emerging and developed markets showed an increase in volatility. 






H0: A rating agency’s announcement has a similar effect on the volatility on the market 
compared to other agencies. 
H1: A rating agency’s announcement has a different effect on the volatility on the market 
compared to other agencies. 
The only agency that was found to have any significant effect on volatility was S&P for both 


















CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study investigated the effect of credit rating changes on the volatility of stock markets. A 
sample with daily volatility for the specified countries, as well as a global volatility index was 
used. The analysis was conducted by calculating abnormal volatility over various event 
windows. It also questioned the difference in reactions between developed and emerging 
markets, as well as the response in volatility to different credit agencies’ announcements. 
The key findings of this study are as follow: 
• Upgrades result in a decrease in volatility, which is consistent with the findings of 
Hooper et al. (2008).  
• Downgrades result in an increase in volatility, which is also in line with the findings of 
Hooper et al. (2008).  
• Developed and emerging markets react similarly regarding volatility to credit rating 
downgrades. This is in contradiction to the results found by Hooper et al. (2008), which 
revealed that the effect on emerging markets’ debt was more pronounced. This is also 
in contradiction to Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) who cites asymmetric information 
and lack of transparency resulting in a larger reaction to a credit rating change albeit for 
stock returns and country risk. However, these results are in line with Brooks et al. 
(2004) who found no significant sensitivity to ratings changes within emerging markets. 
• S&P is the only rating agency to elicit any significant effect on the volatility of the stock 
market. This was the case for both upgrades and downgrades. Fitch and Moody’s 
provided no significant responses in volatility. Norden and Weber (2004) found that 
both Moody’s and S&P exhibit the largest impact on the markets, with Brooks et al. 
(2004) finding that S&P and Fitch’s downgrades impact the market the most.  
In line with the Hooper et al. (2008) study, in relation to financial theory, the results of this 
study show that a rating change does communicate new information to the markets. It speaks 
to the efficiency of the market in being able to process new information provided to it. This is 
in line with the findings from Griffin et al. (2010) who found that both developed and emerging 





This study contributes to previous research on the effects that credit ratings have on the 
volatility of the stock markets by not only analysing a unique sample, but also using a different 
methodology to that of Hooper et al. (2008) and Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012). These 
findings will contribute to the observations around the sensitivity of emerging market responses 
to these rating changes, as well as the rating agencies that have the most effect on the stock 
markets as found by Brooks et al. (2004). 
Recommendations to the various stakeholders is to be mindful that a change in credit rating, 
effect not just bond prices and forex, but also volatility within the stock market. This study has 
implications for investors, governments, pension funds and asset holders by providing them 
with country risk assessments and giving them the ability to rebalance their portfolios in 
response to credit rating changes that may have an effect on the volatility of the stock market. 
It also has an impact in determining the cost of capital and evaluating investments, which affect 
asset allocation decisions. This study has important information, which could help contribute 
to credit rating agencies’ understanding of the implications that their issued ratings have on the 
stock market and contribution to volatility within the market place. The policy implications of 
this study could affect institutions, especially the Basel committee and banking institutions 
whom are highly affected by the policies set out by Basel in their understanding of the effects 
that credit rating changes have on the volatility of the stock market. The expected volatility that 
arises from a change in credit rating could affect the calculations used by Basel in arriving at 
the capital requirements for specific asset classes. 
Further research is needed to understand if other variables that occurred during the event 
window could have contributed to the increased volatility as seen around the event dates. 
Different analysis methods such as bootstrapping the data, as done by Essaddam and Mnasri 
(2014), as well as panel data analysis that Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and 
Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) conducted, could be useful in finding out if the results still 
hold under different methodologies. 
Having a sample that includes upgrades for developed markets could prove insightful to 
understand if these have the same reaction as upgrades in emerging economies. Further research 
could look at rating outlook changes, as well as watch announcements to understand if these 




volatility (if any) and to what extent it exists when countries move in and out of junk status, but 
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APPENDIX A: Rating codes for the various rating agencies 
Fitch S&P Moody’s Rating grade description (Moody’s) 











Minimal credit risk 
AA+ AA+ Aa1 Very low credit risk 
AA AA Aa2 
AA- AA- Aa3 
A+ A+ A1 Low credit risk 
A A A2 
A- A- A3 
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 Moderate credit risk 
BBB BBB Baa2 
BBB- BBB- Baa3 













Substantial credit risk 
BB BB Ba2 
BB- BB- Ba3 
B+ B+ B1 High credit risk 
B B B2 
B- B- B3 
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 Very high credit risk 
CCC CCC Caa2 
CCC- CCC- Caa3 
CC CC Ca In or near default, with possibility of 
recovery 
C C  
DDD SD C In default, with little chance of recovery 
DD D  
D   
 





APPENDIX B: CBOE VIX Calculation 
The generalised formula used in the VIX Index calculation is: 
 

















σ is VIX ⁄ 100 = > VIX = σ × 100 
T Time to expiration 
F Forward index level derived from index option prices 
K0 First strike below the forward index level, F 
Ki Strike price of i
th out-of-money option; a call if Ki > K0 and a put if Ki < K0; both put 
and call if Ki = K0  
∆Ki Interval between strike prices – half the difference between the strike on either side of 
Ki: 




(Note: ∆K for the lowest strike is simply the difference between the lowest strike and 
the next higher strike. Likewise, ∆K for the highest strike is the difference between the 
highest and the next lowest strike.) 
R Risk-free interest rate to expiration 








APPENDIX C: New SAVI calculation 
 Calculating the new SAVI 
The new SAVI is not a polled volatility measurement6. The new SAVI is calculated as the 
weighted average prices of calls and puts7 over a wide range of strike prices, that expires in 3-
months’ time. In short:  




𝑖−1     (1) 
Here: F is the current (on value-date) forward of the FTSE/JSE Top40 index level, determined 
using the risk-free interest rate and dividend yield. F marks the price boundary between the 
liquid put options Pi (Ki), and call options Ci (Ki) with strikes Ki. The prices of the calls and put 
options are determined using the traded market volatility skew that expires in 3-months’ time. 
The 3-month (T) volatility skew, σk(O, T), is determined using the time weighted interpolation 
function (with N1 and N2 being the days to the near skew, and next nearest skew, from the 3-
month skew expiry date, respectively) defined by: 












Here: No is the number of days in the year (365 is the South African convention), and N3 is the 
number of days from the value date to the 3-month date. 
The weights used in equation (1) are that published by Derman et al [3]. The Derman8 

























The new SAVI evaluation methodology for implied volatility measurement using the thinly 




spacing, Ki – Ki+1, of 10 index level points leads to negligible approximation errors within the 
strike range of 70% and 130% option moneyness. Safex therefore calculates the new SAVI 
using a strike spacing of 10 index level points, and a strike range of 70% - 130% option 
moneyness. 
 
5 This crash protection premium is sometimes referred to as the volatility skew convexity 
premium. 
6 This minimises the chances that the calculated volatility index value can be manipulated by 
the polled volatility contributors. 
7 Using calls and puts to find the price of volatility are allowed given that option prices 
(especially at-the-money options) are directly proportional to their input volatility. 
















APPENDIX D: GARCH Model used by V-Lab 
Definition 
Consider a return time series 𝑟𝑡 =  µ + 𝜀𝑡, where μ is the expected return and 𝜀𝑡 is a zero-mean 
white noise. Despite of being serially uncorrelated, the series 𝜀𝑡 does not need to be serially 
independent. For instance, it can present conditional heteroskedasticity. The Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model assumes a specific parametric 
form for this conditional heteroscedasticity. More specifically, we say that 𝜀𝑡~𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 if we 
can write 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡𝑧𝑡 , where 𝑧𝑡 is standard Gaussian and: 
 
𝜎𝑡




V-Lab estimates all the parameters (μ, ω, α, β) simultaneously, by maximising the log 
likelihood. The assumption that 𝑧𝑡 is Gaussian does not imply the returns are Gaussian. Even 
though their conditional distribution is Gaussian, it can be proved that their unconditional 
distribution presents excess kurtosis (fat tails). In fact, assuming that the conditional distribution 
is Gaussian is not as restrictive as it seems—even if the true distribution is different, the so-
called Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator is still consistent, under fairly, mild 
regularity conditions. 
Besides leptokurtic returns, the GARCH model captures other stylised facts in financial time 
series, like volatility clustering. The volatility is more likely to be high at time t if it was also 
high at time 𝑡 − 1. Another way of seeing this is noting that a shock at time 𝑡 − 1 also affects 
the variance at time t. However, if α + β < 1, the volatility itself is mean reverting, and it 
fluctuates around σ, the square root of the unconditional variance: 
𝜎2 ∶= 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑡) =
ω
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
 
Usual restrictions on the parameters are ω, α, β > 0 though it is possible to have ω = 0 and  
α + β = 1. The conditional variance is then an integrated process (shocks to the variance are 
persistent) hence the model is called IGARCH (Integrated GARCH). This is the model Risk 





Let rT be the last observation in the sample, and let ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂? be the QML estimators of the 
parameters ω, α and β, respectively. The GARCH model implies that the forecast of the 
conditional variance at time 𝑇 + ℎ is: 
 
?̂?𝑇+ℎ
2 = ?̂? + (?̂? + ?̂?)?̂?𝑇+ℎ−1
2  
And so, by applying the above formula iteratively, we can forecast the conditional variance for 
any horizon h. Then, the forecast of the compound volatility at time 𝑇 + ℎ  is: 





Notice that, for large h, this forecast of the compound volatility converges to: 
√
?̂?
1 − ?̂? − ?̂?
√ℎ
 
scaling over the forecast horizon with the well-known square-root law, times the estimate of 
the unconditional volatility implied by the GARCH model. 
GARCH (p, q) 
The specific model just described can be generalised to account for more lags in the conditional 
variance. A GARCH (p, q) model assumes that: 
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑡−𝑖







The best model (p and q) can be chosen, for instance, by Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
also known as Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), or by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The former tends to be more parsimonious than the latter. V-Lab uses p = 1 and q = 1 though, 
because this is usually the option that best fits financial time series. 
(NYU - V Lab, n.d.) 
